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WHY BLACK HOMEOWNERS ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE CARIBBEANAMERICAN THAN AFRICAN AMERICAN IN NEW YORK: A THEORY OF HOW
EARLY WEST INDIAN MIGRANTS BROKE RACIAL CARTELS IN HOUSING

ELEANOR MARIE LAWRENCE BROWN*
ABSTRACT
Why are the black brownstone owners in Harlem and Brooklyn
disproportionately West Indian? The landlords, West Indian-American? The
tenants African-American? These are tough questions. For students of
housing discrimination, West Indian Americans have long presented a
quandary. If it is reasonable to assume that racial exclusions are being
consistently applied to persons who are dark-skinned, one would expect to
find that housing discrimination has had similar effects on West IndianAmericans and African-Americans. Yet this is not the case: West IndianAmericans generally own and rent higher quality housing than AfricanAmericans.
Moreover, these advantages began long ago. For example, when racial
covenants, that is, restrictions barring racial and ethnic groups from owning
real property in particular neighborhoods were rife in New York, they were
not consistently applied against West Indians, who were sometimes able to
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buy into tony neighborhoods. While it is true that such covenants were also
inconsistently applied against other ethnic and religious groups such as
Jewish New Yorkers, West-Indians still stand out. Since West Indians are
overwhelmingly dark-skinned persons of African descent they typically did
not have the option of “passing” that may have been available to other
groups.
Eschewing more traditional explanations in the civil rights literature, I apply
the literature in which racial segregation in real property ownership is
conceived as a racial monopoly in which racial cartels appropriate anticompetitive techniques to monopolize access to real property. Maintaining
a racial cartel is dependent on white owners maintaining a united front, that
is, they must uniformly refuse to sell. Importantly, realtors play a
gatekeeping role in real estate and West Indians dominated the realtor
sector. As realtors, they were expert at finding defectors, namely, whites
willing to break norms of racial exclusivity, in exchange for their ability to
extract a premium for selling to blacks early. Brokers then proceeded to buy
significant numbers of titles, which were then off-loaded to fellow West
Indians. West Indian brokers could act in confidence because they had cashrich clients and were often buying in trust (de-facto if not de-jure) for fellow
West Indians.
In so doing, West Indian brokers in New York were simply replicating
techniques that had been utilized by their land-brokering ancestors. I discuss
the history that “previews” this period in New York, albeit in a different
context: in the British West Indian islands from the migrants originated.
There are repeated instances of blacks "busting" white monopolies in landownership, throughout the West Indian colonies in contravention of racial
norms in the British colonies of who was allowed to own land where. Upon
arrival in New York, West Indians encountered another racial monopoly in
real property ownership, namely Northern racial segregation. They
essentially appropriated the same techniques that they had utilized in the
West Indies to break into white neighbourhoods in New York.
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INTRODUCTION
Why are the black brownstone owners in Harlem and Brooklyn
disproportionately West Indian? 1 The landlords, West Indian-American?
The tenants African-American? 2 These are tough questions.3 For students of
1
RONALD SCHMIDT SR., ET AL., NEWCOMERS, OUTSIDERS, AND INSIDERS: IMMIGRANTS
AMERICAN RACIAL POLITICS IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 111 (2009); Kyle D.
Crowder, Residential Segregation of West Indians in the New York/New Jersey Metropolitan Area:
The Role of Race and Ethnicity, 33 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 79 (1999); see also EMILY ROSENBAUM
& SAMANTHA FRIEDMAN, THE HOUSING DIVIDE: HOW GENERATIONS OF IMMIGRANTS FARE IN
NEW YORK’S HOUSING MARKET (2007).
2
Of course, there is a long and fraught history of discrimination against African Americans in realproperty ownership both in the post-bellum South and in the North after the Great Migration. Some
relevant articles in the legal scholarship are summarized in Footnote 111, infra. For articles
discussing comparative housing patterns between West Indians and African Americans, see Kyle
D. Crowder & Lucky Tedrow, West Indians and the Residential Landscape of New York City, in
ISLANDS IN THE CITY: WEST INDIAN MIGRATION TO NEW YORK (Nancy Foner ed., 2001); Arun
Peter Lobo & Joseph J. Salvo, The Newest New Yorkers, 2000: Immigrant New York in the New
Millenium, 1999; ROSENBAUM AND FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, PHILIP KASINITZ, CARIBBEAN NEW
YORK: BLACK IMMIGRANTS AND THE POLITICS OF RACE 90-95 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press
1992), PAULE MARSHALL, BROWN GIRL, BROWNSTONES (1981).
3
There is a significant background literature on West Indian success, with several sources
discussing the property markets. See, e.g., Winston James, Explaining Afro-Caribbean Social
Mobility in the United States: Beyond the Sowell Thesis, 44 COMP. STUD. IN SOC’Y & HIST. 218
(2002) [hereinafter James, Explaining Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility]; see also Winston James,

AND
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housing discrimination, West Indian Americans have long presented a
quandary.4 West Indians, like African Americans, are overwhelmingly dark
skinned persons of African descent who were enslaved (albeit in the West
Indies rather than the United Sates) and are phenotypically indistinguishable
5
from African-Americans. Thus, if it is reasonable to assume that racial
exclusions are being consistently applied to persons who are dark-skinned,
one would expect to find that housing discrimination has had similar effects

New Light on Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility in New York City, A Critique of the Sowell Thesis,
in NEW CARIBBEAN THOUGHT: A READER (Brian Meeks & Folke Lindahl eds., 2001) [hereinafter
James, New Light on Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility]; IRA DE A. REID, THE NEGRO IMMIGRANT:
HIS BACKGROUND, CHARACTERISTICS, AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT, 1899-1937 (Arno Press 1969)
(1939); NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT (1970);
ETHNICITY: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE (Nathan Glazer & Daniel Patrick Moynihan eds., 1975).
4
ROSENBAUM AND FRIEDMAN, supra note 1 at 121.
5
I will regularly refer to two groups of Blacks. The first group, African Americans (often pithily
referred to in the literature as “native” Blacks), includes those descended from Africans who were
enslaved here in the United States. The second group, West Indians, has a different historical
heritage. These are persons who were enslaved in the West Indies but were not enslaved in the
United States and who later became migrants to the United States, mostly after the abolition of
slavery in the United States. The term “West Indians” as utilized in this Article does not generally
include West Indian immigrants to the United States of other ethnic backgrounds. See Calvin B.
Holder, West Indies: Antigua, Bahamas Barbados, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guyana, Martinique, St.
Kitts, Trinidad, in THE NEW AMERICANS: A GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION SINCE 1965, at 674-75 (Mary
C. Waters & Reed Ueda eds., 2007 (describing the migration of West Indians to the United States
and identifying the group as racially diverse, but predominantly Black). In this Essay, I utilize the
term “black” West Indian—as opposed to Afro-West Indian or African-West Indian. In this
context, the term “black” West Indian refers only to West Indians of African descent and does not
include, for example, West Indians who belong to other racial minority groups, such as persons of
East Indian heritage were sometimes referred to as “black” in the United Kingdom (to whom the
West Indian colonies largely belonged at the time). Winston James has a comprehensive statistical
summary of pre-1965 black immigration to the U.S. by region of origin. Early black immigrants
were overwhelmingly of Caribbean origin. Prior to World War II, blacks known as “British West
Indians” appeared to outnumber all other black migrant groups by a large margin, with Jamaica,
the most populated British West Indian island, supplying the largest number of immigrants. I use
the term “ British West Indies,” “West Indies” or “West India” in the sense in which it is typically
used in the historical literature, namely to refer to the Caribbean islands in the Greater and Lesser
Antilles. These include Antigua and Barbuda (which were governed by the British as a political
unit), St. Kitts and Nevis (same), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (same), Trinidad and Tobago
(same), Barbados, St. Lucia, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, and Guyana.Indeed, Jamaicans have
been the largest group of black Caribbean immigrants for some time, only recently being overtaken
by Nigerians. See, James, Explaining Afro-Caribbean Social Mobility, supra note 3.
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on West Indians6 and African-Americans.7 As one author notes, “levels of
segregation suggest that the housing and neighborhood characteristics of
African Americans and West Indians should be indecipherable.”8
Yet, this is not the case. West Indian neighborhoods are
distinguishable from African American neighborhoods. Take, for example,
indices of segregation. West Indians occupy neighborhoods with lower
indices of segregation than African Americans.9 West Indians also occupy
better quality rentals and own better quality homes than African
Americans.10
These statistical patterns are less surprising where West Indian
households earn more than African American householders.11 In a Harpers
cover story, James Traub noted that West Indians seemed to place significant
value not only on home ownership, but indeed on owning many homes.12 He
interviewed West Indians of apparently modest means, who had worked
multiple jobs, to acquire multiple homes. 13 For example, one blue-collar
couple had acquired an apartment building; the rental income was then used
to acquire further buildings.14 West Indian success patterns merited a frontpage story in the New York Times.15 When the finding that black per-capita
income in certain sections of Queens, New York exceeded white per-capita
income elicited nationwide news coverage, sociologists in-the-know
recognized that the blacks in question were home-owning middle-class West
Indians.16
6

I utilize the definition of West Indians that is conventionally used in the sociological literature,
namely, Anglophone (formerly British-colonized) Caribbean nationals. The migrants were
overwhelmingly descendants of slaves and “coloreds.” The sociologist-historian Orlando Patterson
provides a summary of the significance of the West Indies from which the migrants originated and
its social structure as follows:
“The sugar plantations, which became all-important by the turn of the eighteenth century,
made the Afro-Caribbean societies the richest areas of the world. They also set the basic social
structure and tone of these societies. African slaves were brought in on a large scale, resulting in
the early demographic dominance of black people. Ruling them was a small minority of white
planters . . . Between masters and slaves a third group soon emerged—the coloreds or people of
mixed ancestry. This group formed a useful racial and socio-cultural buffer between the whites
and blacks. By the end of the eighteenth century a substantial number of them were freedmen.”
See Orlando Patterson, Context and Choice in Ethnic Allegiance: A Theoretical Framework and
Caribbean Case Study, in ETHNICITY: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE, supra note 3 [hereinafter
Patterson, Ethnic Allegiance].
7
ROSENBAUM AND FRIEDMAN, supra note 1 at 118.
8
Id. at 121.
9
Id. at 119.
10
Id. at 121.
11
Id. at 118.
12
James Traub, You Can Get It If You Really Want, HARPER’S, June 1982.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
See Sam Roberts, In Middle-Class Queens, Blacks Pass Whites in Household Income, N.Y.
TIMES (June 6, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/06/nyregion/in-middle-class-queensblacks-pass-whites-in-household-income.html; see also Sam Roberts, Blacks Incomes Surpass
Whites in Queens, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/nyregion/01census.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
16
Rosenbaum and Friedman, supra note 1.
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But even when researchers control for income, the West Indian
advantage in housing stock appears to persist.17 Thus, there may be other
factors at play. For example, one sociological study contends that “the
tendency of West Indian households to occupy better quality housing and
neighborhoods than African Americans directly results from their relative
concentration in formerly middle-class white neighborhoods that had stocks
of owner-occupied homes.18 That is, West Indians were more likely to buy
into “solid” white neighborhoods. Moreover, West Indians have long
dominated the black realtor sector.19 Given the "gatekeeper" role played by
realtors, one cannot help wondering whether West Indians have had
advantages in mitigating the effect of housing discrimination that have
typically not been available to African Americans. 20
There are good reasons for this suspicion, although the evidence is
largely anecdotal. In the article that arguably launched Malcolm Gladwell’s
career, he reflects on the employment trajectory of his Jamaican co-ethnics
shortly after their arrival from the West Indies in 1920 New York.21 Like
many immigrants of the time, many sought jobs in garment factories. 22
These garment factories were typically segregated; moreover, the
segregation was deeply institutionalized as evidenced by the existence of
separate unions for black and white garment workers. 23 Yet, Gladwell’s
West Indian subjects sought and received jobs in factories where signs were
posted stating “Negroes need not apply,” despite being recognizably darkskinned persons of African descent.24
Indeed, West Indians were able to get jobs in several lines of work
that had previously either been reserved for “whites only” or had been
segregated – including porters, elevator operators, nursing aides and so
17

Id.
Id. at 121 (describing the concentration of West Indians in formerly White middle-class
neighborhoods).
19
IRMA WATKINS-OWENS, BLOOD RELATIONS: CARIBBEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE HARLEM
COMMUNITY, 1900–1930, at 46 (1996) (discussing the heavy representation of West Indians
among black realtors).
20
See VILNA FRANCINE BASHI, SURVIVAL OF THE KNITTED: IMMIGRANT SOCIAL NETWORKS IN A
STRATIFIED WORLD 182-206 (2007).
21
Malcolm Gladwell, Black Like Them, NEW YORKER, Apr. 29, 1996, at 74, 78. ). Gladwell also
discusses long-standing tensions between African Americans and his Jamaican co-ethnics (borne
partly from differential treatment by employers.
22
Id.
23
Id.; see also LEIGH DAVID BENIN, THE NEW LABOR RADICALISM AND NEW YORK CITY’S
GARMENT INDUSTRY: PROGRESSIVE LABOR INSURGENTS IN THE 1960S (Stuart Bruchey, ed.
2000); Herbert Hill, The Untold Story, THE CRISIS (November 1962); Robert Laurentz,
Racial/Ethnic Conflict in New York City Garment Industry 1933-1980 (Ph. D. dissertation, State
University of New York at Binghampton 1980).
24
Id., This point is made by prominent Harlem Renaissance intellectual, W.A. Domingo in W.A.
Domingo, The Tropics in New York, SURVEY GRAPHIC, Mar. 1925, at 648, 649 available at
http://www.unz.org/Pub/TheSurvey-1925mar01; W. A. Domingo, Gift of the Black Tropics, in
ALAIN LOCKE, ED., THE NEW NEGRO: AN INTERPRETATION (1925)). See also Dennis Forsythe,
Black Immigrants and the American Ethos: Theories and Observations, in CARIBBEAN
IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 55, 65–66 (Roy S. Bryce Laporte & Delores M. Mortimer
eds., 1983) (same).
18
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forth.25 Thus one might say that West Indians were at the forefront of the defacto (if not de jure) “integration” of the workplace in 1920s New York, long
before comprehensive legislation existed to preclude racial discrimination in
employment.26
This is a book about property and yet I have begun with a narrative
about work. Why? There are significant analogies between West Indian
trajectories of upward advancement in both areas. To understand the
analogies one might consider Richard Brooks and Carol Rose’s book Saving
the Neighborhood. 27 It tracks the trajectory and persistence of racially
restrictive covenants, that is, restrictions barring racial and ethnic groups
from owning real property in particular neighborhoods. Such covenants were
applied with particular force against certain racial, ethnic and religious
groups in the pre-civil rights era.28 Drawing on the law and social norms
literature, their thesis is that the persistence of these covenants even after
their enforcement was outlawed by the Supreme Court was less about their
enforceability than about their value in “signalling” norms of racial
exclusivity.29
The connection between Brooks and Rose’s narrative and
Gladwell’s Jamaican garment workers is implicit. A workplace sign saying
“Negroes need not apply,” is the employment equivalent of a racially
restrictive covenant. If we argue by analogy to Brooks and Rose, these
workplace signs have a signalling value in employment, just as racially
restrictive covenants do in property. The narratives of 1920s West Indian
New Yorkers indicate that while racial discrimination was rife with the
accompanied signalling (“Negroes need not apply; this property may not be
sold to Negroes”), these exclusions were not being consistently applied to
West Indians in both the domains of employment and property. The question
becomes what was so special about West Indians?
In this Essay, I offer an entirely new narrative that is outside the
traditional civil rights discourse. The traditional comparative approach to the
study of the effects of institutional barriers to housing would entail the
following steps. First, comparative scholars consider two groups of people
who are ostensibly similar (namely, African Americans and West Indians,
both groups being "black"). Second, they observe different outcomes
(namely, West Indians occupying better housing than African Americans).
25

This point is made by references in the previous footnote.
One might also see the work of Winston James, on the black radicals of the Harlem Renaissance
who were disproportionately West Indian. Many of these radicals were involved in the labor
struggles of early 20th Century New York City. See generally, Chapters 5 and 6 of WINSTON
JAMES, HOLDING ALOFT THE BATTLE OF ETHIOPIA: CARIBBEAN RADICALISM IN EARLY
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (1998). Chapter 5 of JOYCE MOORE TURNER, CARIBBEAN
CRUSADERS AND THE HARLEM RENAISSANCE (2005) is also helpful. The most comprehensive
treatment is actually BRUCE NELSON, DIVIDED WE STAND: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY (2002). Chapter 2 is particularly helpful.
27
RICHARD R.W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS (2013).
28
Id.
29
Id.
26
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Third, they consider how discriminatory frameworks operate differently with
respect to the two groups of people.
This Essay takes a different approach. In fact, it is unclear to me that
West Indians are necessarily an appropriate comparative group. In Part I, in
a brief background to the larger argument, I address a few of the theories that
have been prominent in the civil rights literature. These theories might be
classified in the tradition of the prominent sociologist Goffman as
“performative.” 30 The central idea that performative theories share is that
particular groups (in this case, West Indians) are better at “performing” so as
to assuage stereotypical (white) fears (about blacks), and these
“performances” have tangible benefits in several arenas including housing.31
In Part II, I transition to my alternative argument. I note that in the
early decades of the 20th Century when West Indians started arriving in New
York, homeowners were almost entirely white elites. Blacks (although their
numbers were miniscule) and poorer whites were essentially excluded from
home-ownership. Relying on the work of other scholars, I note that racial
segregation in real property ownership (and the associated racial covenants)
may be conceived as a racial monopoly in which racial cartels appropriate
anti-competitive techniques to monopolize access to real property.32
In Part II, I also note that maintaining racial exclusivity in certain
neighborhoods was dependent on white owners maintaining a united front,
that is, they must uniformly refuse to sell.33 West Indian realtors were expert
at finding defectors, namely, whites willing to break norms of racial
exclusivity, in exchange for their ability to extract a premium for selling to
blacks early. Thus, West Indian brokers then proceeded to buy significant
numbers of titles, which were then off-loaded to fellow West Indians. West
Indian realtors could act in confidence because they were often buying in
trust (de-facto if not de-jure) for fellow West Indians. 34 I also note that
arguably West Indian realtors were engaged in "blockbusting." 35 Decades
later, during the civil rights era, blockbusting gained notoriety as the
deliberate promotion of “racial tipping” in previously all-white or integrated
neighborhoods for speedy transition to black neighborhoods by realtors and
other real estate players seeking quick financial gain.36 I contend that early
West Indian realtors, appropriated techniques that arguably approximated
blockbusting and preceded their mid-century peers by decades.37
Theories of “passing” and “covering” are peformative theories. The oft-cited definition of
covering comes from Erving Goffman’s classic, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
SPOILED IDENTITY (1986) namely trying to rendering a characteristic invisible. The term has been
more recently popularized again in Kenji Yoshino’s COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR
CIVIL RIGHTS (2006).
31 See infra Part I.
32
Id.
33 See infra Part II.
34 Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
See infra Part I.
30
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In Part III, I transition to the history that “previews” this period in
New York in the British West Indian islands from which West Indian
migrants originate.38 I note that there are repeated instances of West Indians
"busting" white monopolies in land-ownership, throughout the West Indian
colonies in contravention of racial norms in the British colonies of who was
allowed to own land where. Upon arrival in New York, West Indians
encountered another (albeit different) racial monopoly in real property
ownership, namely Northern racial segregation. They essentially
appropriated the same techniques that they had utilized in the West Indies to
break into white neighbourhoods.39
In Part III, I also apply Hirschman's classic framework of "voice,"
"exit," and "loyalty." I note that in the aftermath of Emancipation in the
British West Indies, when given a "choice" to remain on sugar plantations
(in sharecropping relationships that many West Indian freedmen believed too
closely approximated slavery), freedmen overwhelmingly chose "exit." But
West Indian freedmen were able to exit only because they had land to exit
to. At this point, I re-introduce the thesis on busting racial monopolies. West
Indian land ownership was facilitated in part by white “defectors,” that is,
white land-owners who deviated from norms of racial exclusivity and
“cashed out” by selling their plantations to black people.
West Indian blacks were not passive players in this process. Several
plantation owners were “converted” by a savvy black land-brokering class,
who created reserves of cash for land purchase by pooling the resources of
their clients. That is, land brokers acted as trustees of cash deposits for
multiple prospective purchasers, while cultivating cash-strapped members of
the plantocracy. When planters were ready to sell, they pounced and paid
cash up-front.
In Conclusion, I note that there are also traces (but only traces) of
the legal transplant literature. This historical practice of activity in the land
markets in the West Indies has long-term legal consequences in the United
States. This is an unconventional legal transplant argument as I have no
formal law to substantiate the argument.
But rules matter, even if they are only norms and not embodied in
formal law. The efficiency of black West Indians in acquiring property in
their islands of origin was undergirded by a set of rules, namely rules that
solved collective action problems by allowing land brokers to buy land in
trust on behalf of other West Indians. These rules also protected future landowners from unscrupulous trustees. Brokers had significant opportunities for
opportunistic behavior. Yet, they rarely ran off with the money of their
fellow West Indians because such behavior would have entailed communal
expulsion. Similar patterns are replicated when they arrived in New York
City.
Admittedly, the legal-transplant literature is not a perfect fit. For
example, that there is not much in the way of "law," namely, state-backed
38
39

See infra Part III.
Id.

9

rules, that were formally transplanted from the West Indian context to New
York. Nevertheless, West Indians brought with them a robust set of norms
which governed how they operated in housing and land markets. One might
think of West Indians as comparable to diaspora ethnic minorities such as
the Chinese in Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia, or the Maghribi Jews in
the "Muslim West" who traded across borders with informal rules in complex
capital markets long before the development of formal commercial law,
either domestically or transnationally.
I.

PERFORMATIVE THEORIES

The narratives of 1920s West Indian New Yorkers indicate that while
racial discrimination was rife with the accompanied signalling (“Negroes
need not apply; this property may not be sold to Negroes”), these exclusions
were not being consistently applied to West Indians in both the domains of
employment and property.40 Take, for example, sections of upscale Harlem
that were understood to be “all white.”41 Much to the surprise of leading
journalistic observers, moderately affluent West Indians were permitted to
live alongside whites, albeit in small numbers.42
This occurred even as the exclusions, and particularly racial covenants,
were legally enforceable; indeed, racially restrictive covenants were
widespread in Harlem at the time. 43 At least with respect to these quasiaffluent West Indians, racially restrictive covenants appear to have been
sometimes ignored.44 What was so special about West Indians?
There are a number of factors that might account for this disparate (and
advantageous) treatment of West Indians in relation to other blacks. Indeed,
a skeptical reader might wonder: why is this phenomenon so special?
Notably, West Indians were not atypical in this respect. For example,
another group that was often the target of racially restrictive covenants was
Jews. 45 Yet Jews were often purchasing property even when covenants
clearly stated that property may not be sold to members of the “Hebrew
race.”46
Racial covenants which purported to constrain purchases by members of
the “Hebrew race” were widespread well beyond the 1950s.47 Indeed it is
clear that discrimination more generally against persons of Jewish heritage
40

See infra Part II.
Id.
42
Id.
43
Kevin Fox Gotham, Urban Space, Restrictive Covenants and the Origins of Racial Residential
Segregation in a US City, 1900-50, 24.3 INT’L J. OF URB. & REG’L RESEARCH (2000), available at
http://tulane.edu/liberal-arts/upload/RestrCovenants.pdf ; GILBERT OSOFSKY, HARLEM: THE
MAKING OF A GHETTO: NEGRO NEW YORK 1890-1930 (1971).
44
See infra Part II.
45
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 27.
46
Id.
47
Id.
41
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was still rife (in employment, schooling and property markets, for
example).48 Yet, simultaneously there is evidence that many early Jewish
families overcame these barriers.
Jews who bought properties in spite of discriminatory covenants
essentially did so by what Dershowitz would deem “passing.” Dershowitz is
critical of those who mask their underlying Jewish identity, particularly
Jewish migrants and their descendants in the United States, which he deems
to be the most favourable environment in which Jews have settled as a
minority (leaving Israel aside, where Jews constitute a majority).49 However,
it seems unfair to label a failure to mention religious heritage when
conducting property-related transactions as “passing,” since religious
heritage could hardly be relevant to property transactions. Why mention
what is not relevant?
Irrespective of what one thinks of “passing,” the typical West Indian
conducting a property-related transaction (in contravention of a racial
covenant), would have been different than someone of Jewish heritage
conducting a similar transaction (again, in contravention of a discriminatory
covenant.) Typically, these West Indians were not “passing.” 50 Notably,
many of these West Indians (even affluent ones) had no such “opt-out”
option. Most West Indians were clearly phenotypically black51 and as such
were clearly “outsiders.” That is, as blacks, West Indians were clearly among
the targets for whom the aforementioned Brooks/Rose “signals” were
intended.
Although “passing” may not explain the West Indian presence in white
neighbourhoods, Yoshino’s work in the gay civil rights scholarship, reminds
us that “passing” has a close cousin, namely, “covering.”52 That is, even if
West Indians did not have the option of passing (i.e. masking their
48
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underlying identity), they may nevertheless have been "covering." Those
who engage in “covering” retain and disclose the underlying identity, “but
make it easy for others to disattend.”53
In an arguably related argument in “Working Identity,” Carbado and
Gulati assert that many racial minorities “proactively work their identity to
avoid discrimination in the first place.” 54 Notably, blacks “work” their
identities to negotiate inter-group discrimination (for example, landlords or
employers preferring whites over blacks). As importantly, they “work” their
identities to negotiate intra-group discrimination (that is landlords or
employers preferring some black people over other black people).
We have long known that there are elements of identity that might be
classified in the tradition of the social theorists, Goffman and Butler as
“performative.” The notion that some West Indian blacks “work” their
identities to their benefit (and by extension to exclusion of other blacks,
namely, native African Americans) is a quintessentially performative
theory. 55 Dershowitz was making essentially an equivalent point with
respect to “passing” Jews.
Moreover, long before it surfaced in the civil rights scholarship, this
point was made (with pointed candor) in real life. West Indians were well
known for emphasizing that they were “British subjects” - a phenomenon
that has been referred to as “performing Britishness.”56 A. Phillip Randolph,
the civil rights leader chastised West Indians for retaining their status as
British subjects, as opposed to naturalizing to American citizenship. 57
Randolph’s point was implicit: West Indians were abusing the good graces
of Americans by choosing to retain their status as British subjects, even as
they enjoyed the benefits of long-term American residency, without taking
on the requisite obligations of American citizenship (including civil rights
activism).
That is, Randolph felt that West Indians believed that they were better
off as “British subjects” rather than as “colored” Americans. One could
hardly find a better real-life example of a group being accused of
performative identity. The question seems clear: were West Indians
beneficiaries of “covering” or “working” their identities in housing as well?
All of these paths lead to one question: how did West Indians become
“insiders,” that is, to occupy some status sufficiently different than the
conventional "outsider" status, to render them eligible (even informally) for
housing, traditionally denied to persons of African descent? This is the
puzzle that this essay seeks to engage. Something seems not to add up . . .
53
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II. HOW WEST INDIANS CAME TO BUY INTO WHITE NEIGHBORHOODS
A. Prelude 1900-1920
How did West Indians come to enter white neighborhoods in the first
place? West Indians starting arriving in New York in significant numbers in
the early 1900s.58 The early narratives of West Indian migrant life in New
York, as told by the earliest migrants, indicate that they did not initially meet
with significant resistance.59 Indeed some early West Indian migrants moved
into white neighborhoods. 60
According to Massey and Denton’s classic on residential
segregation, American Apartheid, segregation was hardly an issue, in most
modern cities, including New York prior to the early 1900s.61 The West
Indian experience upon arrival in New York dovetails well with Massey and
Denton’s historical narrative.
It bears emphasis that at the time that West Indians starting arriving
in New York, the black population was miniscule (less than 3%).62 At the
turn of the century, the number of West Indians (and indeed the number of
African-Americans) would have been too small to occasion notice.63 It was
only when blacks start arriving in Northern cities in large numbers that the
institutional forces that we typically associate with segregation began to
arise.64 These institutional forces included race-based steering by realtors,
race-based residential advertising, and so forth.65
B. 1920 onwards: Racial cartelization
In the period immediately preceding 1920, there was a dramatic
increase in the number of blacks in New York City, occasionally by a burst
of migration of West Indians, as well as African-American migrants from
the South. 66 Although blockbusting, as an institutional force which
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accelerates segregation,67 has been out of vogue as an academic topic for
decades, it clearly featured prominently in New York City. Indeed,
blockbusting appears to have been taking place in New York as early as the
1920s.68
By way of background, blockbusting is the deliberate facilitation of
“racial tipping” in previously all-white or integrated neighborhoods for
speedy transition to black neighborhoods. Such “tipping” is typically
facilitated by realtors (and other actors in the real estate industry) bent on
eliciting super-commissions.69 Notably, blockbusting is an academic term
of much later heritage than 1920s New York; blockbusting only emerges as
a phenomenon in literature in the 1950s.70 However, in this section, I argue
that the actions of early West Indian realtors provided a preview of
blockbusting.
Indeed, they appropriated techniques that arguably
approximated blockbusting and preceded their mid-century peers by
decades.71
Black realtors seeking to open up more housing to their black clients
(while simultaneously making commissions), were up against significant
institutional forces. For example, Massey and Denton discuss how
“voluntary associations” of white citizens in Northern cities (as opposed to
the South, which we more typically associate with institutionalized
segregation) were extraordinarily vigilant in ensuring that their
neighborhoods remained “whites only.”72 Every effort was made to prevent
blacks from entering certain neighborhoods, including threatened boycotts
of white real estate agents who cooperated with black agents, and the
withdrawal of support from white businesses that served black customers.73
Others went as far as "collect[ing] money to create funds to buy property
from black settlers or to purchase homes that remained vacant for too long;
[and] offer[ing] cash bonuses to black renters who agreed to leave the
neighborhood."74
Massey and Denton’s classic is typically where scholars of
segregation start.75 However, Massey and Denton are writing primarily of
the 1950s and later decades. Moreover, they do not discuss New York in the
67

It bears emphasis: blockbusting is a term of much later heritage (circa 1950s). See Dmitri
Melhorn, A Requiem for Blockbusting: Law, Economics, and Race-Based Real Estate Speculation,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145 (1998).
68
See New York Times articles, infra note 170.
69
Blockbusting came to widespread public attention through a widely read article in the Saturday
Evening Post. Following the public outcry that accompanied this article, there were a range of
federal, state and municipal initiatives to prevent blockbusting. Norris Vitchek, Confessions of a
Block-Buster, SATURDAY EVENING POST, July 14, 1962.
70
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 61.
71
Given Melhorn’s broader view of the important market roles played by blockbusters in opening
up new housing to blacks, one might anticipate a similarly charitable assessment of their West
Indian counterparts. See MELHORN, supra note 67.
72
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 61.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.

14

detail that they do Chicago.76 Osofky’s classic study of the development of
Harlem is helpful in this regard.77 While to modern minds, Harlem is known
as an iconic black community (the “capital of black America”), it was
originally white.78 Moreover, it was one of the first communities in which
West Indians settled.79 Osofky makes clear that the techniques discussed by
Massey and Denton in mid-century Chicago, were also utilized by whites in
Harlem to discourage black settlement. 80 Moreover, they were utilized as
early as the 1920s.81
Viewing racial segregation in real property ownership through the
lens of the antitrust literature,” Roithmayr deems white neighbourhood
associations “racial cartels.”82 What is a racial cartel?83 Cooter analogizes
racial cartels to conventional cartels noting that “[j]ust as producers collude
to fix prices and obtain monopoly profits, so [racial cartels] collude to obtain
the advantages of a monopoly control over markets.”84
One such market is the real estate market. Appropriating Cooter’s
terminology, Roithmayr argues that a segregated residential community is a
classic example of a racial monopoly. 85 Alongside homeowner’s
associations, Roithmayr argues that real estate boards, as well as collectives
of white real estate agents, were quintessential examples of “cartel”-type
organizations.86
These organizations played a critical role in policing racial
covenants, typically noted on deeds, which prevented white homeowners
from selling to blacks. And it bears emphasizing that racial covenants were
perhaps the most genial of many pernicious methods utilized to exclude
blacks. In New York, as in Chicago, such techniques included boycotts of
white real estate agents who cooperated with black real estate agents.
Racial covenants were of course, classic tools of anti-competitive
behavior – they served an important role in curtailing black access to
property in certain neighbourhoods. If the neighbourhood associations
discussed by Denton and Massey in mid-century Chicago were racial cartels,
there is little doubt that similar associations in Harlem in the 1920s merit a
similar label.
76
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Roithmayr goes further arguing that “early neighbourhood
advantage” secured by racial cartels, has now become “locked-in.” 87
Utilizing analogies from the antitrust literature, she notes if a firm’s anticompetitive conduct occurs early enough in the development of an industry,
this conduct may provide the firm with such a significant advantage that
other competitors find it virtually impossible to catch up. 88 In other words,
“the ‘early-mover’ advantage . . . can become self-reinforcing over time” so
much so that economists refer to the early mover advantage as being “lockedin.” 89 For example, Microsoft’s oft-cited success with the Windows
operating system (to the exclusion of other operating systems) illustrates a
classic example of institutional “lock in.” 90
Similarly, Roithmayr argues that early neighbourhood advantage
becomes “locked in” through “self-reinforcing neighbourhood effects.” 91
These include job-referral networks (which are heavily neighbourhoodbased) and mechanisms of financing public schools (in which better off
neighborhoods receive better public financing given their deeper property
tax base). 92 Even if the language of antitrust seems strange when utilized in
this context, the sociological literature provides significant support for
Roithmayr’s thesis. If Roithmayr is right, whether or not blacks are
successful in “breaking” racial cartels early may have long-term implications
for whether they access critical networks needed to improve their economic
prospects.
Hence the assumption which is implicit in the literature (namely that
West Indians and African Americans were in the same boat with respect to
residential segregation in New York) needs to be called into question. While
there may have been early institutional similarities with respect to how
residential segregation operated against West Indians and African
Americans, the institutional differences are potentially significant. The early
clue of a critical difference between the two groups is what the sociological
literature clearly substantiates – namely that West Indians were able to
access owner-occupied middle class white neighborhoods, earlier and in
larger numbers.
Indeed, if we follow through the implications of Roithmayr’s thesis,
the critical difference between early African-American migrants and early
West Indian migrants to New York City may be the extent to which early
racial cartels in housing constrain their long-term opportunity sets. Thus,
while institutional exclusion may have been “locked in” in relation to
African Americans, this may not be true (or may be less true) of West Indian
Americans. My thesis is that West Indian Americans were at least partially
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successful in busting the racial cartels which characterized segregated
neighborhoods – the subject of the next section.
C. White defection
The long-term success of any cartel is at least partly dependent on
its ability to prevent defection among its members.93 To prevent defection,
cartel members typically threaten each other with severe retaliation. 94
Moreover, the threats have to be not only severe, they also have to be
credible. 95 Thus, it is unsurprising that the primary techniques (detailed by
Denton and Massey and later deployed by Roithmayr to support her racial
monopoly model) are focused on the prevention of white defection.96
If the prevailing norm was one of racial exclusivity in housing, the
key was to prevent whites from deviating from this norm. 97 If they did not
sell, there would be no homes for blacks to buy. White voluntary associations
realized that the key to keeping neighborhoods all white was pinpointing
whites who were at risk of defection.
Thus, it is not coincidental that a series of articles in the New York
Times (contemporaneous with the initial black entries into white
neighborhoods) discuss efforts to publicly “shame” whites who sold property
to blacks, and intermediaries involved in the transactions (such as white real
estate agents) -- not unlike the methods detailed in the Massey and Denton
extract above. 98 The point was clearly to drive home that the costs of
defection (including but not limited to reputational costs), would be
significant. One can hardly imagine that it was good for business to be
publicly shamed.
A return to Brooks and Rose is in order. Brooks and Rose begin the
book by underlining the persistence of such covenants well into the second
half of the twentieth century. 99 One need only consider the deeply
controversial revelation during Justice Rehnquist’s nomination hearings (for
the position of Chief Justice) that he held property with a racially restrictive
covenant, 100 long after Shelly v. Kraemer, the landmark case that held that
such covenants were unenforceable.101 Brooks and Rose address the puzzle
of the persistence of such covenants, even after Shelly v. Kraemer.102
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Drawing on the law and social norms literature, their thesis is that
the existence of such covenants is less about their enforceability than about
their value in “signalling” norms. 103 These covenants signal to racial
“insiders” that they can rest assured that only fellow insiders are welcome in
the neighborhood. 104 Similarly, they signal to outsiders that they need not
apply.105 The mere “signal” had significant value in accomplishing policy
goals that may now seem anachronistic such as the preservation of property
values (even at the significant cost of black exclusion) and the reduction in
social tension (which was thought to be more likely if blacks and whites were
not living together).106
Potential defectors should typically conduct a cost-benefit analysis:
will I gain more from the short-term defection than I gain from long-term
participation in the cartel?107 Thus, the key to eliciting defection from the
aforementioned norms is to raise the benefits from short-term defection. A
prospective seller who believes that she can get cash (a lot of it, and up front)
will perhaps convince herself that she can move into a nicer neighborhood.
For this reason, it is unsurprising that accounts of the time accuse
both white agents (and by extension black agents acting in concert with
them) of taking advantage of an atmosphere of racial panic to make
extraordinary commissions for themselves.108 The returns for their clients
(certainly the earliest defectors) would have had to have been similarly
impressive. This would be particularly true in relation to whites who sold
later and presumably for less, given that the entry of blacks typically lowered
real estate values.109
There are of course, at least two ways of looking at this: one could
characterize a West Indian broker (acting in concert with a white broker,
since blacks could not represent whites) as taking “advantage” of “racial
panic.” Or one could simply look at it as West Indian realtors expanding
market access for their clients who were facing a paltry, substandard, and
overpriced “black” housing stock.
But, the fact remains that irrespective of the moral lens through
which one views such transactions, no West Indian broker would be in a
position to take advantage of "racial panic" without cash. West Indians were
well placed to elicit defections because they had cash. I believe that my claim
is a modest one. What distinguished West Indians from their peers in the
black realtor sector (and from African Americans more generally) was that
they had cash;110 they dominated the black realtor sector because they stood
103
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out for their relatively liquidity (and for the liquidity of their clients). 111
Cash-rich blacks were still virtually unheard of at the time.112
This is why I believe that my claim is modest – West Indians were
able to elicit defections, simply because they had cash. Notably, they had
cash because they arrived from the West Indies having long been owners of
real-property in their home countries. 113 Also importantly, they had cash
because binding rules undergirded their transactions and rules facilitated the
availability of liquidity.114
West Indians buyers were more likely to be able to access informal
credit that allowed them to generate cash when needed.115 That is, even when
they did not have immediate cash, they had access to informal mortgage
financing.116 A seller should be indifferent if a buyer needs a mortgage, as
long as the mortgage closes sufficiently quickly to produce cash in short
order. Notably, West Indians had such access to mortgage financing (first
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informally and then formally) long before such financing formally existed –
particularly for blacks.117
Agents and developers who buy on behalf of clients with cash have more
leverage – they can buy more confidently and elicit better terms. The
efficiency of black West Indians in acquiring property in their islands of
origin was undergirded by a set of rules, namely rules which solved
collective action problems by allowing land brokers to buy land in trust on
behalf of other West Indians, secure in the knowledge that the cash would be
found. 118 Rules also protected future land-owners from unscrupulous
trustees. 119
Similarly brokers in New York had significant opportunities for
opportunistic behavior. Yet, they rarely ran off with the money of their
fellow West Indians, because such behavior would have entailed communal
expulsion. Thus patterns from the West Indies replicate themselves in New
York.
D. Anecdotal evidence to support this theory: What we know from the
historical sources
Modern studies clearly state that West Indians are more likely to occupy
higher quality housing either as homeowners or renters than African
Americans. 120 Moreover, they are more likely to live in integrated
communities. 121
The question becomes: How far back does this evidence go? How do we
know that West Indians were better placed (in relation to African Americans)
with respect to property rental and acquisition? It bears emphasis that there
is virtually no empirical work on comparative housing stock between West
Indians and African-Americans in the first half of the twentieth century, even
as they were both began migrating to New York in significant numbers at
122
about the same time. However, we can piece together from other historical
sources ample evidence that West Indians were more likely to live in
majority white communities or mixed black-white communities. 123
Moreover, these same sources support the view that West Indians have had
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better access to housing, and were also able to occupy higher quality housing
in the early 20th century than African-Americans. 124
Extrapolating from this early evidence to modern demographic studies,
one study goes as far as to contend that despite being black West Indian,
New Yorkers had a pattern of ascent in the housing market that is most
appropriately described as “ethnic.”125 Thus, in the housing market, West
Indians are more appropriately analogized perhaps to Italian, Irish or Jewish
New Yorkers than to African Americans.126
While made specifically in the context of the housing market, this
argument seems to channel the sociologists, Moynihan and Glazer’s wellknown contention that although they were overwhelmingly black, West
Indians’ pattern of socioeconomic ascent in New York, was not unlike that
of “white ethnics.”127 Yet another historian has argued that that despite being
Black, West Indian New Yorkers have historically exercised what he terms
an “ethnic option” (typically available to white ethnics), not available to
native African Americans of choosing housing accommodations in higherquality neighborhoods.128
Despite the absence of empirical work on comparative housing stock
between African-Americans and West Indians in the early 20th century, this
is a literature to be reckoned with. 129 Indeed, the sources utilized to justify
these contentions are voluminous, not unlike those typically used by
historians of black life at the time, including, journalistic accounts (New
York had a very vibrant black press from early in the 20th century), and
personal diaries. 130 In the absence of empirical evidence, I must rely instead
on a narrative-based methodology (an admitted limitation based on the
evidence of the period).
From this literature, we know the following. West Indians dominated the
black realtor market starting early in the Twentieth Century. 131 By way of
background, in a segregated housing market, the realtor businesses were
similarly segmented. 132 Thus, there existed a white realtor segment and a
black realtor segment. 133
Black realtors were particularly important players in a period of rapid
black migration (of African-Americans from the South and of West Indians
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from the islands), which led to a significant demand for housing among
blacks.134 Given the racial segmentation of the real estate market, high levels
of black demand for property put upward pressure on prices in black
communities. As the black “middle men,” West Indian realtors acted as “gobetweens” between blacks seeking to sell to other blacks, but also as gobetweens between white homeowners and black buyers.135
In one sense, the emphasis of West Indian success in the real estate
sector in the literature was not atypical; the West Indian dominance of
business has long been the subject of significant sociological inquiry. Indeed,
the iconic West Indian businessman first came to prominence in the literature
a century ago during the Harlem Renaissance136 and nowhere was the West
Indian influence in business more comprehensive than in real estate. Yet it
still bears emphasis that the presence of a core of West Indian real estate
agents in the early 1900s was remarkable as this was a profession in which
racial minorities and women were notoriously poorly represented until quite
recently.137 The most successful realtors were those who were able to take
advantage of the aforementioned defectors from the norms of racial
exclusivity, as was discussed in the previous section.138 In the next section,
I discuss a case study of one particular West Indian realtor who was able to
do this particularly successfully.
E.

Tipping

A series of articles in prominent papers like the New York Times, detail
several streets in which whites and blacks were living in close proximity in
the first two decades of the Twentieth century, primarily, in the more elite
134
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sections of Harlem like Sugar Hill. 139 Notably, many of the blacks discussed
in these articles were owners rather than renters. These blacks were
overwhelmingly West Indians who had come from the islands with cash
reserves, few native African Americans were in a position to rent (much less
own) homes in these areas at this time.140
While these communities co-existed with a few blacks, white flight
quickly ensued once blacks began to move in significant numbers into the
larger Harlem community (as opposed to its most elite sections).141 Heeding
the call of the African American “father of Harlem”, the realtor Phillip
Payton, that it was possible to “make money from racism,” 142 the wellknown Barbadian millionaire speculator, Solomon Riley began a pattern of
behavior that bears a resemblance to what later became known as
“blockbusting.” 143
Riley’s narrative is of particular interest. Long a millionaire, he resided
on a very tiny Harlem street alongside whites. 144 At first his tenure was
peacable, but when other blacks began to express an interest in the area, his
neighbors expressed increasing displeasure at his presence in the
neighborhood.145 Previously, he believed that he had been protected by the
widespread disbelief among whites that there were other blacks rich enough
to move into the more affluent sections of Harlem.146 To add insult to injury,
his wife was white at a time when inter-racial marriage still met with
widespread societal disapproval. 147
Riley later told his tale to a New-Deal era Works Progress
administration researcher, who was conducting federally funded research on
the history of Harlem. 148 Given increasing expressions of hostility from his
neighbors, he moved. 149 In an effort to extract revenge on his bigoted
neighbors, he then deliberately sought a black family to whom he could lease
the property. 150 Having sought to eject one black family, he wanted to make
the point that they would simply find themselves with another. 151
Athough Riley argues that he was simply motivated by revenge, it is
worth mentioning that his actions might have been motivated by economic
self-interest. By way of background, as more blacks moved to New York,
and white communities reacted with hostility by “penning” blacks into
139
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particular areas, housing became difficult to secure for blacks generally. 152
Notably, this was increasingly true even for affluent blacks.153 Thus, Riley
could surely have extracted a premium from a black tenant (that he would
not necessarily have been able to extract from a white tenant). Given the
black housing shortage in a racially segregated market, the opportunities for
arbitrage were significant.154
Riley’s narrative continues: his white neighbor, panicking at the
evidence of yet another black family with the resources needed to move into
the neighbood, decided that he would no longer stay and moved at short
notice.155 Riley, by his account, did nothing to disabuse his former neighbor
of the notion of a pending black onslaught (one cannot help wondering
whether he helped feed the panic).156
Sensing an opportunity, he bought his neighbors home at a discount. In
an effort to increase the likelihood that his former neighbors would sell, his
wife conducted transactions on his behalf and he often bought properties in
her name. 157 He then moved yet another black family into his former
neighbor’s home as tenants.158 And then another neighbour moved.159 And
so he found himself building quite an asset base by acquiring tiny
townhouses at significant discounts as panicked whites moved in a hurry.160
Notably, since there remained so few places for blacks generally to rent (and
particularly so few elite places), he remained able to charge premium rents
for his newly aquired townhouses.161
Features of this story stand out. First, Riley was in the neighborhood in
the first place because he had the cash. If his account is credible, his early
acceptance by his neighbors seemed based on their perceptions that few
blacks would be in a position to buy the property.
Moreover typically in a racially segregated housing and realtor market,
tipping would require the cooperation of both black and white agents – white
agents to service the families moving out and black agents to provide service
to the families moving in.162
Yet as Riley tells the story, he was not acting in concert with white
agents to “tip” the neighborhood. 163 On the contrary, he was a
homeowner. 164 Neighbors created a hostile environment which led his
family to exit the neighborhood, and his neighbors got their “just deserts”
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when black tenants moved in. 165 Indeed, he could quite reasonably have
argued that they should have reasonably forseeen that the future tenants
would be black. 166 That is, given the racial temper of the period, one could
not reasonably have expected whites to rent from a black man.167
Although the fact that his wife often conducted transactions on his
behalf probably helped, this could hardly have remained a secret for long.168
While hiding behind his wife could be construed as “passing,” (or if not,
“covering”) the success of “passing” as a strategy is inextricably intertwined
with ignorance of the black identity of the ultimate buyer. It is unclear that
“passing” would have worked in the long term given the notoreity that
ultimately accompanied Riley’s acquitions.
But it bears emphasis that Riley could quite reasonably have provided
a self-interested account. Riley might well have been involved in deliberately
eliciting racial tipping. Given the opportunities for arbitrage, it is perhaps
inevitable that agents would begin to act as Riley did. Moreover, as a simple
matter of business efficiency, it is eminently understandable that Riley could
justify his behavior as simply satisfying the preferences of his black clients
who preferred to live with blacks. 169
For example, one account of the period from the New York Times
suggests that white and black players were acting in concert to “tip”
neighborhoods.170 One owner of several buildings in Harlem, Mr. Meyer
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was cited as an owner who appeared to be acting in concert with black
realtors. (Given the racial temper of the time period, one cannot help
wondering whether anti-Semitism underlies the New York Times focus on
Mr. Meyer). 171 Mr. Meyer was accused of notifying white tenants that they
would have to vacate, shortly before selling to cash-rich blacks (represented
by black realtors). These black buyers would then quickly fill the building
with black tenants.172
Moreover, Mr. Meyer was accused of heaping further indignities on his
former white tenants, some of whom were unable to secure replacement
housing given the short notice. 173 These whites found themselves having to
negotiate for lease extensions with the new black owners through their black
agents who were largely West Indians. 174 The New York Times notes that
the indignity was even further compounded by the fact that blacks began to
move into their buildings very shortly after the buildings were transferred to
black owners -- thus white (former) tenants found themselves living
temporarily beside black (new) tenants.
While other West Indians in the property business did not provide such
rich historical accounts as Riley, the historian, Watkins-Owens notes that it
is likely similar strategies were utilized by Adolph Howell, a West Indian
principal in the Sphinx Realty Company, and William Roach, a
phenomenally successful Montesseratan who was principal in the Sarco
Realty Company.175 That is, having bought low from fleeing whites, they
sold or leased high to blacks who were desperaate for decent real estate.
Notably, Sarco was dominant not only in residential housing in Harlem but
also owned several presitgious commercial addresses in Harlem.
It is not that these “tipping” patterns were exclusive to West Indians.
Indeed, African Americans realtors undoubtedly replicated similar patterns,
and in fact preceded their West Indian peers. Yet while African American
realtors, such as Phillip Payton and John Nail, first opened Harlem in the first
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decade of the Twentieth Century, few of their companies lasted.176 This is
unsurprising – indeed, many white realty companies were unable able to
survive the extended downturn of the Great Depression. West Indian realtors
were often not only brokers, but also real estate developers. Given the poor
availabilty of credit generally at the time (and particularly for black
businessmen), many of the West Indian purchases were cash purchases. All
this is to say that although some of the West Indian broker/developers failed
during the Great Depression, they appear to have had deeper reserves, and
longer staying power thant their African American peers in this difficult
period.
A pattern of West Indian dominance of Black access to segregated
housing markets through their control of the realty business appears to have
been present throughout New York. Their influence extended outside of
Harlem. In Brooklyn, for example, the Carringtons were prominent Black
177
players in residential real estate. Fellow West Indians were believed to
have privileged access to homes that the Carringtons controlled.
F. Related factors that allowed West Indians to quickly consolidate
their gains
There were related factors that allowed West Indians to quickly
consolidate their gains in these neighborhoods. For example, there appear to
have been integration across housing-related businesses, so that West Indian
advantages in one line of business carried over to another. For instance, the
Paragon Credit Union, which provided mortgage support to Brooklyn-based
West Indians (especially Barbadians), received referrals primarily from the
178
Carrington brothers. The same referral process appears to have been
important to the West Indian–founded Victory Insurance Company, which
179
provided insurance for West Indian–owned homes and businesses. In
addition, Watkins-Owens documents a plethora of far smaller but highly
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180

influential West Indian real estate market participants. For example, there
were hundreds of operators of boarding houses who provided West Indian
renters with an early foothold in neighborhoods where they would later
181
become homeowners. This was arguably the genesis of the West Indian
182
advantage in home ownership.

III. ANALOGIES TO WEST INDIAN HISTORY
A. Map of this section
By way of background, in the early decades of the 20th Century when
West Indians started arriving in New York, homeownership in the US was
largely limited to whites with resources.183 Blacks (although their numbers
were miniscule) and poorer whites were essentially excluded from homeownership. 184 Homeownership did not become more broadly based until
federal government intervention in the home mortgage market decades
later.185 Even later, when poorer whites gained access to federal financing
for home mortgages, blacks were typically excluded from such programs.186
This section summarizes how they were able to sidestep such exclusions –
their initial success in busting such cartels was critical.
In this section, I also provide further evidence for the argument that with
respect to residential segregation in the early decades of the Twentieth
Century, West Indians are not necessarily an appropriate comparative group
to African Americans. Notably, West Indians had multiple tools at their
disposal (borne of their experience and capital gained in the West Indies) in
“busting” racial cartels in real property. 187 That is, tools that worked well in
the West Indies translated well to New York.
180
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Indeed, there are repeated instances of West Indians "busting" white
(British) monopolies in land-ownership, throughout the British West Indian
colonies in contravention of racial norms of who was allowed to own land
where. 188 Applying Hirschman's classic framework of "voice," "exit," and
"loyalty,"189 I note that in the aftermath of the abolition of slavery, former
West Indian slaves were given a "choice" of remaining on sugar plantations
in relationships that approximated sharecropping (“loyalty”) as opposed to
leaving the plantations (“exit”). 190
Of course, this was never really meant by the plantocracy to be a
“choice” for newly freed blacks. 191 Rather, the plantocracy was seeking to
institute a system of tenancy rent (that is, sharecropping) as a mechanism of
reducing cash outflows from their sugar plantations. Under this system,
planter would “lease” the land to the newly freed slave in return for a share
of the crops on the land (or some other in-kind rental payment). 192
Emancipation greatly increased the “cash crunch” faced by planters. Indeed,
cash outflows from plantations would necessarily have increased given the
now-free labor (previously unfree slave labor) who needed to be paid. 193
Tenancy rent provided a mechanism of reducing cash outflows for creditconstrained farmers. 194
To this end, the plantocracy, utilized every mechanism at their disposal
to prevent newly freed West Indians from buying land. 195 After all, freedmen
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who were already land-owners were unlikely to sign up for sharecropping.
196
That is, the plantocracy sought to maintain a racial cartel in landownership.
Yet, West Indians overwhelmingly chose "exit." 197 They were
facilitated in large part by self-interested white defectors, who were seeking
to “cash” out their plantations and were willing to transgress norms of racial
exclusivity to achieve these ends. 198 They were also facilitated by the
development of a black land-brokering class, who acted as trustees for black
buyers, pooled cash, identified white defectors and acted as go-betweens for
planters willing to sell and freedmen with cash. 199
B. The Prelude: Property during Slavery
Prior to the American Revolution, the American colonies and the West
Indies (as British colonies) had similar historical trajectories. 200 There is
good reason for the focus of historians on the West Indies, despite its small
size – it was in the West Indies that plantation slavery was “perfected” (to
use the words of Ulrich Phillips, the early historian of the U.S. South) before
it was “exported” to other colonies (such as the then British-colonized
Carolinas). 201 It was precisely this point that Ulrich Phillips, the early
American historian of the U.S. South, emphasized:
As regards negro slavery the history of the West Indies is
inseparable from that of North America. In them the
plantation system originated and reached its greatest scale,
and from them the institution of slavery was extended to the
continent. The industrial system on the islands, and
particularly on those occupied by the British, is accordingly
instructive as an introduction and a parallel to the
continental regime.202
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Whatever early institutional similarities there may have been between
the plantation systems in the West Indies and the U.S. South, the institutional
differences between the West Indies and the U.S. South will be clear to many
readers, even as I do not typically make overt comparisons to plantation
slavery in the U.S. The two critical features of the West Indies were first,
its relative isolation and second, the precarious nature of shipping routes (on
203
which planters were initially dependent to import food to feed slaves).
These features of the West Indies ultimately became critical to the
evolution of property arrangements among the slave ancestors of West
Indian property owners who later migrated to the United States. Another
relevant feature of the West Indies was its economic importance to the
Exchequer (British Treasury). Indeed, Jamaica at the peak of its productivity
in the eighteenth century was among the most valuable colonies, worth
204
significantly more than all of the New England colonies combined.
In my view, these features of the political economy of the West
Indies provided incentives for the plantocracy to innovate in property and
contracting arrangements with respect to the slave population. 205 Their
important task was to get the slaves to feed themselves. To achieve this goal,
importantly they had the support of the British Parliament. Thus, critical
interests were aligned in achieving this goal: Parliament, the plantocracy,
plantation financiers and the slave population (which far outnumbered the
British population).
If the slaves could feed themselves, there would be less of a stress
on precious plantation working capital (no cash outlays needed to import
expensive food from London utilizing precarious shipping routes),
Parliament would not need to entertain pained reports from the colonies
about how slave malnutrition was compromising plantation productivity, and
founding of South Carolina in 1670—imported slaves from Barbados. See BETTY WOOD, THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 64–65 (1997) (discussing the connection between the
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the Treasury’s coffers could continue to rely on plantation taxes. 206
Financiers could rest easier knowing that it was more likely that planters
would pay their debts. Moreover, the slaves were eager for a system that
would keep them better fed. 207
As economists have long told us, secure entitlements incentivize
effort; commerce increases the payoff from effort even more. 208 The
plantocracy implicitly understood this with respect to local food production;
they supported informal slave entitlements in plots to grow food and the
produce that came from these plots. 209 These plots came to be known as
“provision grounds”, and the rights that surrounded them looked very much
like formal property rights, although the regime was essentially informal. 210
The result was the evolution of a slave culture involving increasingly
complex forms of property arrangements – which I have termed in a separate
paper “de facto property rights”, including inheritance-like devices. 211 These
slaves became what I term “property holders” in waiting.212
Demsetz’s classic paper on property rights argued that “the
emergence of new property rights takes place in response to the desires of
the interacting persons for adjustment to new benefit-cost possibilities.” 213
The thesis is very Demsetzian – property rights emerged for slaves (who
were themselves property) in response to the demand for them at multiple
levels of plantation society. 214 Moreover, not only were slaves property
holders; slaves also were contractors, increasingly engaging in commerce;
they became the dominant players in the food economy. 215

C. Emancipation
The system of allocating provision lands (property-lite) to the slaves
was widely supported at multiple levels of plantation society during
206
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slavery.216 Emancipation threatened to turn everything upside down.217 Once
labor becomes free, this relationship of reciprocal obligation (which is
fundamentally a status relationship) is completely severed. 218 Any
contractual relationship (be it one grounded in tenancy or employment) is
fundamentally far more tenuous for the planter than a relationship grounded
in status.219
And what to do with the property which the slave occupies but the
planter has legal title to, i.e. former provision grounds at the edge of the
plantation? 220 If the freedman continues to work for the planter, perhaps
there is an ongoing basis for his continuing occupancy of provision grounds
at the edge of the plantation on which he can grow food (as he had done
during slavery under the previously described informal and innovative
arrangements).221 In such a case, the planter has a clear justification for the
continuing occupation of the land by the former slave -- the slave’s ongoing
low-cost labor on the plantation can be understood as an in-kind rental
payment. 222 Indeed, such an arrangement may even be beneficial to the
planter’s cash-flow.223 Theoretically, just as the freedman “pays” him for the
land through low-cost labor or a share of crops, he “pays” the freedman (in
kind), with less of a need for a cash-outlay. 224
Suppose the freedman declines employment on the plantation? One can
expect the planter to ask himself the following: Why is a (former) slave, now
freedman, remaining on land that is formally mine if I am no longer obligated
to provide for him? What am I getting out of it? Predictably, there was a faceoff between the planters and the newly freedmen.
D. Exit, Voice, Loyalty
Prior to full Emancipation, there was a period in which newly freed men
225
served as “apprentices” on plantations. Apprenticeship was conceived as
a mixed slave labor/free labor period to prepare for full Emancipation.
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Although in practice many slaves continued to be treated as they had been in
slavery, during an apprenticeship, the slave was technically to be
226
compensated for work beyond the time allocated for compulsory labor.
Upon full Emancipation, the newly fully freedmen were no longer
obligated to remain with the plantation. Thus, the options that confronted
West Indian freedmen when they sought to exercise their newfound freedom
are reminiscent of Albert Hirschman’s famous conceptual ultimatum
(“voice/exit/loyalty”).227 Albert Hirschman famously argued that members
of any human grouping (be it a nation, a business, a religious group or a
family) have three main options when they perceive that the grouping is no
longer beneficial to them. Similarly, the freed slaves had three options.
First, they could remain on the plantation in an employment
relationship largely on the planter’s terms (“loyalty”). For example, they
could continue to accept wages that were as a practical matter planterdetermined. Second, they could remain on the plantation but with a more
robust set of protections. These protections would include guaranteed leave
(particularly for the women who wanted guaranteed days off to prepare for
weekend markets where slave-grown food was sold), assurances that they
could reap crops planted even in the event of a later severing of the
employment relationship and eviction, and market determined wages (which
would theoretically be subject to some bargaining on the part of freedmen,
particularly in those islands where labor was inclined to be short). This
would approximate “voice.” Those exercising “voice” could extract
concessions for their ongoing loyalty.
Notably, although the concessions associated with “voice” should
theoretically have allowed them to build assets, for many slaves this was not
enough. For these slaves, the better option was “exit.” Those who already
had assets (particularly land) could actually credibly threaten to exit
undesirable plantation relationships, and proceed to do so. My argument is
that across the region, exit predominated.
E. Who could exit?
The likelihood that slaves would exit depended largely on two
factors – the availability of cash and the availability of land. Certainly in the
earliest days of Emancipation, any cash that the slaves had would have most
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wages.
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likely been accumulated during slavery. 228 The availability of cash with
which they could buy land was in turn tied to the extensiveness of the
provisioning system (during slavery), that allowed them to grow crops which
they could then market, in a particular island.229
A primary reason that the West Indies is such a wonderful place for
a comparative study of the evolution of property regimes (in practice as
opposed to just in law) is that there were distinct topological and size
differences between the islands that had significant implications for land
allocation, both during and after slavery. It provides a wonderful (and
admittedly informal) “natural experiment” through which to view the thesis
offered here: that is where freedmen had options, exit predominated, with a
corresponding “busting” of racial cartels in land-ownership.
For example, some colonies (Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and
Tobago) were larger with more plentiful arable land. 230 And even when
planters were unwilling to give arable land to slaves, there remained more
marginal land in close proximity to the plantations on which the slaves could
plant.231 Other islands (Barbados, St. Vincent, St. Kitts) were much smaller.
Planters were less inclined to be generous because every acre given to slave
was an acre not available for sugar plantation.232 So in these islands, although
provisioning did occur, it was more marginal, with garden “plots” as opposed
to more fulsome lands.233 In Barbados, in particular, which is compromised
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almost entirely of flat arable land, nearly all land was consumed by the
plantocracy.234
Thus, in the larger islands, the provisioning system was much more
extensive. 235 Slaves grew more food and the food markets were more
plentiful. There were myriad cash crops that would allow for slaves to
accumulate assets. Moreover, since manumission was ongoing (certainly up
to the beginning of Apprenticeship), there were real incentives to accumulate
cash.236 The bottom line: in the larger islands like Jamaica and Guyana,
slaves were more likely to have cash because they had been serious market
participants for some time.237
Thus, in sum my argument is that across the islands, one might
envision a continuum, with “loyalty” and “voice” being more likely in the
smaller islands and “exit” being more likely in the larger islands. The larger
the likelihood was of “exit,” the more quickly we are likely to witness the
busting of racial cartels in plantation ownership.
A final point is in order: what happened with respect to property
acquisition during slavery (when there were no formal protections) turns out
to be singularly important. The irony is that the extensive nature of the
provisioning system (with the extensive exposure that it provided slaves to
informal property arrangements or a “property-lite”) made it less likely that
ex-slaves continued to remain in the employ of the masters once they had a
real choice. Rather, because they had cash, they were well positioned to bust
racial cartels in land ownership.
As we later see in New York, the key to busting racial cartels is white
defectors. And at first the plantocracy seemed united in their view that newly
freedmen would not get access to additional land. Moreover, even though
the British Parliament passed the Amelioration Act 238 which recognized
various aspects of slaves’ legal personhood, and which contained an
apparently generous slate of property and contract rights, slaves rightly
understood that the prospects for enforcement were poor.
After all, it was eminently clear that there would have been no
Emancipation, had it been for the plantocracy.239 Emancipation had been
234
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secured because of parliamentarians in Westminster who were somewhat
removed from the weakened West Indian plantation interests. Enforcement
of these newfound property and contract rights was a different matter;
enforcement was up to the Colonial Office – staffed by civil servants based
in the West Indies (far from London) who answered (in part) to the local
legislatures (dominated by the plantocracy). Thus, whether or not these rights
would be enforced was an open question.240
Moreover, setting aside questions of enforcement, even for those
slaves who had assets, there remained questions of land availability.241 There
were typically only two options for buying land, plantation lands and Crown
(that is, government owned) lands. 242 The availability of plantation lands
would of course be determined by the plantocracy. And the availability of
Crown lands would be determined by the Colonial Office. Here again, the
parliamentarians in Westminster would be too far removed to help, even if
they were so inclined. 243
To achieve their goal of ensuring consistent access to low-cost labor,
in many islands the planter-controlled Colonial legislatures, introduced
policies of restricting freedmen’s access to Crown lands by essentially
pricing them out of the market. 244 Additionally, the Colonial Governor
(appointed in London, but typically close to the plantocracy) was typically
empowered to raise the reserve price of Crown lands with little notice. 245
Thus, if planters found themselves without access to consistent low-cost
labor, the Colonial office would simply raise the price of land such that
freedmen were no longer able to afford land. 246
Simultaneously, groups of freedmen, determined to secure their own
land, pooled their resources and banded together to locate lands to
purchase.247 They would then appoint trusted leaders in the community to
conduct land purchases on their behalf.248 Having located land, they were
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empowered to purchase land in trust, and then sub-divide the land, so that
each of the contributing freedmen would receive land according to his
contribution to the larger pool of funds. 249 Herein was the beginning of the
land-brokering class.
For the planters to tie the slaves to the plantations, they needed to
maintain a united front. More specifically, they needed to ensure that there
was no land for the slaves to buy. But there was no sense in a strategy of
precluding slave access to Crown lands if there were defectors (who were
willing to sell to slaves).
Suffice it to say that within the plantocracy, defectors began to
emerge. Because many of the freedmen had cash, a minority of planters
rightly viewed the policy of restricting freedmen’s access to land as
foolhardy. Why not cash out?
Predictably, as we see later in New York, cracks began to appear in
the racial monopoly in land ownership. The cash-rich trustee land-brokers
were well positioned to close deals with defecting whites.

CONCLUSION
Rules matter, even if they are not embodied in formal law. The
efficiency of black West Indians in acquiring property in their islands of
origin was undergirded by a set of rules - namely rules, which solved
collective action problems by allowing land brokers to buy land in trust on
behalf of other West Indians while protecting future land-owners from
unscrupulous trustees. Brokers had significant opportunities for
opportunistic behavior. Yet, they rarely ran off with the money of their
fellow West Indians, because such behavior would have entailed communal
expulsion. Similar patterns are replicated when they arrive in New York
City.
It bears emphasis that the legal-transplant literature is not a perfect
fit. For example, I argue that there is not much in the way of "law," namely,
state-backed rules, that were formally transplanted from the West Indian
context to New York. Nevertheless, West Indians brought with them a robust
set of norms which governed how they operated in housing and land markets.
One might think of West Indians as comparable to diaspora Chinese
(in Indonesia, Phillipines and Malaysia to name a few countries) now famous
250
in the law and development literature, or to the Maghribi Jews (in the
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"Muslim West") for that matter. Diaspora minorities traded for decades (and
indeed centuries), not only domestically but also transnationally. That is,
they operated in complex capital markets, long before the development of
formal commercial law, either domestically or transnationally.
There were rules that governed their transnational trade. That there
rules were informal does not undermine their long-term effectiveness across
borders and over centuries. These rules were very much legal transplants,
even if they were largely informal.
One might think of West Indians as modern equivalents of Maghribi
Jews.251 Rules from a different place and time – allowed them to bust racial
cartels in New York – decades, indeed centuries later.
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